I believe that more unhappiness comes from this source than any other-I mean from the attempt to prolong family connection unduly and to make people hang together artificially who would never naturally do so. The mischief among the lower classes is not so great, but among the middle and upper classes it is killing a large number daily. And old people do not really like it much better than the young.

- Samuel Butler, The Note Books of Samuel Butler

I am sick to death of bonding through kinship and "the family," and I long for models of solidarity and human unity and difference rooted in friendship, work, partially shared purposes, intractable collective pain, inescapable mortality, and persistent hope.... Ties through blood-including blood recast in the coin of genes and information -have been bloody enough already. I believe that there will be no racial or sexual peace, no livable nature, until we learn to produce humanity through something more and less than kinship. -Donna J. Haraway, Modest_ Witness@Second-Millennium.FemaleMan©_Meets_OncoMouseTl

One afternoon some years ago, I was talking with an elderly Malay man and the conversation turned to the local system of kinship. He summed up his disillusionment with the system by remarking "kasih bunga, balas tahi," which means "you give flowers, but get shit in return." This type of sentiment is widely shared among Malays (see Peletz 1996; Carsten 1997), the majority of whom are nonetheless deeply committed to the moral ideals enshrined in local kinship. Such a paradox is one reason why I attempt to make sense of ambivalence (the simultaneous experience of powerful, contradictory emotions or attitudes toward a single phenomenon). A second reason is the prominence of ambivalence in much of the work carried out in the reconstituted field of kinship - hereafter referred to as the "new kinship studies" (see, for example, Weiner 1976, 1992; Rapp 1982; Trawick 1990; Weston 1991; Strathern 1992a, 1992b). A third has to do with the fact that in anthropology as a whole, there have been few if any efforts to chart out why such themes have become salient in recent years. More broadly, anthropologists have devoted scant attention not only to the myriad sources of ambivalence but also to their implications for an understanding of structure and agency as well as critically important processes of sociality, domination, and resistance. One consequence of this relative neglect is that many treatments of these latter processes are, to borrow Sherry Ortner's (1995) term, "culturally thin"; another, more general consequence is the limited ability to address effectively the Janus-faced dimensions of the human experience, which as John Comaroff (1994) has noted, are central to a good deal of contemporary scholarship.

The present essay represents a modest exploratory effort to help rectify this situation. My main objectives are to highlight the treatment of ambivalence in various sites in the study of kinship since the 1940s, to explain why the theme has become especially salient in the past two decades, and to emphasize its significance for future studies of kinship and social relations. The discussion takes the form of a historically oriented survey that begins with selected examples of the "old kinship studies" and proceeds to various sites in the new kinship studies. I argue that in dealing with kinship, early anthropologists' concerns with structure, function, and homeostatic systems left little room for analytic discussions of ambivalence as such. Many adherents of the new kinship studies, in contrast, devote considerable analytic attention to the theme of ambivalence. This is partly because the new kinship studies are heavily gendered, and display a pronounced concern with power, practice, agency, and sociality, all of which are thoroughly suffused with- or inevitably raise issues having to do with -mixed emotions, and are thus highly conducive to discussions of them. I also assert that notwithstanding recent advances in our understanding of the latter issues, ambivalence remains relatively undertheorized in contemporary work on kinship, and that in this particular respect, there is a frequently overlooked continuity between the old and new kinship studies.

One final set of introductory comments relates to terminology and conceptual orientation. Following the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), I use the term "ambivalence" to refer to the simultaneous "coexistence ... [of two or more powerful] contradictory emotions or attitudes (as love and hatred) towards a person or thing," which may entail emotional or attitudinal "oscil lation, fluctuation, variability," and so on. (Some of the OED's literary references to ambivalence are instructive: "Christianity has always had an ambivalent attitude toward the family"; "the story of ambivalent love is ... characteristic ... of the 19th century"; and "Auden's attitude in his poetry is ambivalent; he cannot help disapproving [and] ... praising.") Ambivalence may be relatively "bivalent" or "binary," involving a "back and forth" between two (or two sets of) powerful, conflicting emotions or attitudes toward a single phenomenon; or it may be more "multi-" or "polyvalent," as in one technical meaning of the Latin root ambi- ("around" or "about"), thereby suggesting perambulatory emotions or attitudes.' It may, in any case, derive from divergent interests, each calculated with respect to different values, aims, or constraints. Ambivalence is distinguished from "diffidence" - modesty, bashfulness, or reluctance to express one's emotions, attitudes, or selfwhich is sometimes (mis)taken as shallowness or absence of affect (as in the celebrated protagonist of Albert Camus' L'Etranger). Ambivalence also differs from "ambiguity," which refers to phenomena of a more cognitive -as distinct from emotional-sort. More specifically, the term ambiguity is used here to index uncertainty, in the sense that some expressions, gestures, and so forth are capable of being understood in two or more ways, and so have double, multiple, or indeterminate signification. Something that is ambiguous is therefore indistinct, equivocal, not clearly defined, and in some instances, obscure. The terms ambivalence, diffidence, and ambiguity are thus analytically distinct, although there is semantic and experiential overlap for a variety of reasons: emotions and attitudes have cognitive entailments; cognitive phenomena may be colored by "feeling-tones"; ambivalence may foster ambiguity, and vice versa; and both may follow from the internalization of multiple frameworks of evaluation.

AMBIVALENCE IN KINSHIP FROM THE 19405 THROUGH THE 19705

In his first monograph on the Nuer, E. E. Evans-Pritchard (1940) recognized that kinship as a moral system necessarily cuts both ways, and that the doubleedged nature of kinship stems partly from the fact that kinship is heavily freighted with moral entailments in the form of expectations and obligations that are often burdensome or impossible to fulfill .2 Evans-Pritchard also made clear that honoring such expectations and obligations brings little guarantee of the diffuse (or other) reciprocity or solidarity that is so frequently inscribed in kinship as a whole, and that is in any case typically enjoined on those who benefit most directly from honoring the expectations and obligations in question.

Additional points to bear in mind about Evans-Pritchard's treatment of mixed emotions in kinship are that many of his observations on the subject pertain to Nuer ambivalence toward fellow clansmen, were disparate and scattered, and were not worked into his heavily idealized analysis of Nuer social relations. These features of Evans-Pritchard's work are in keeping with the precedent set by his mentor, A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, especially in the latter's celebrated exposition ([1924] 1952, [1940] 1952) of joking relationships. They are evident in the following passages:

> If you wish to live among the Nuer you must do so on their terms, which means that you must treat them as a kind of kinsman and they will then treat you as a kind of kinsman. Rights, privileges, and obligations are determined by kinship. Either a man is a kinsman, actually or by fiction, or he is a person to whom you have no reciprocal obligations and whom you treat as a potential enemy. Every one in a man's village and district counts in one way or another as a kinsman, if only by linguistic assimilation, so that, except for an occasional homeless and despised wanderer, a Nuer only associates with people whose behaviour to him is on a kinship pattern. (Evans-Pritchard 1940,183)

So far, so good: kinship-and patrilineal descent specifically-provides an orienting framework for the content and ideology of Nuer social relations as well as the hegemonic idioms in terms of which such all-encompassing relations are cast. But Evans-Pritchard proceeds to observe that these relations also make explicit certain imperatives: "Nuer must assist one another, and if one has a surplus of a good thing he must share it with his neighbors. Consequently no Nuer ever has a surplus" (183). Evans-Pritchard is unequivocal on this point:

> Nuer are most tenacious of their rights and possessions. They take easily but give with difficulty. This selfishness arises from their education and from the nature of kinship obligations. A child ... learns that to maintain his equality with his peers he must stand up for himself against any encroachment on his person and property.... [H]e must always be prepared to fight, and his willingness and ability to do so are the only protection of his integrity as a free and independent person against the avarice and bullying of his kinsmen. They protect him against outsiders, but he must resist their demands on himself. The demands made on a man in the name of kinship are incessant and imperious and he resists them to the utmost. (184)

The contention that Nuer resist demands of kinship may strike readers as hyperbole, especially in light of Evans-Pritchard's claims that ideologies of kinship reorder and contain all "ground-level noise." More important is that the implications of these and other statements bearing on contradictory imperatives, divergent interests, and the internalization of multiple frameworks of evaluation were not integrated into Evans-Pritchard's overarching model of Nuer society. (Such generalizations also apply to Radcliffe-Brown, as indicated earlier.) Nor, I should add, were the implications of the ambivalences documented in his second volume on the Nuer (Evans-Pritchard 1951), which dealt more directly with marriage, family, and household relations. In other words, while Evans-Pritchard and Radcliffe-Brown alike drew attention to ambivalence in a dramatic and explicit fashion, the theme does not inform the central theoretical concepts of their writing. This is because the (structural-functional) concept of structure that undergirds EvansPritchard's and Radcliffe-Brown's work led them to focus primarily on the formal interrelations and reproduction of corporate groups, and the extent to which they could be seen as "hav[ing] a high degree of consistency and constancy" (Evans-Pritchard 1940, 262). Such a stress involved the relative analytic neglect of the sociality of everyday life -in which context one is quite likely to encounter mixed emotions -even though in Evans-Pritchard's case, it was his firsthand observations and experiences of this very sociality that provided him with both his entree into Nuer society-including the politicojural domain -and much of the raw data for his understanding of it.

Evans-Pritchard's comments about Nuer resisting the demands of kinship resonate with observations made in subsequent years by Meyer Fortes, who was both a student and colleague of Evans-Pritchard. Since Fortes, unlike Evans-Pritchard, went to some length to develop an understanding of the morality of kinship, it is useful to first turn to some of his ideas on the latter subject.

Many of Fortes's ideas on the morality of kinship are summed up in his discussions of "the axiom of amity" (1969), a concept that is more complex than is often recognized and one that does make provision for some measure of ambivalence.' On the one hand, Fortes talks of "kinship morality that is rooted in the familial domain and is assumed everywhere to be axiomati cally binding. This is the rule of prescriptive altruism which I ... refer to as the principle of kinship amity and which ... [some have called] the ethic of generosity" (232). On the other hand, Fortes explicitly draws attention to the ambivalence built into "the ideal that kinsfolk should love one another" by saying that "many ties of close kinship (notoriously, siblingship) ... subsume rivalries and latent hostilities that are as intrinsically built into the relationships as are the externally oriented amity and solidarity they present" (237-38; compare Kelly 1977; Marshall 1981; Smith 1983; Peletz 1988). Unfortunately, however, like Radcliffe-Brown ([19241 1952, [1940] 1952) and Claude LeviStrauss (1949, 1963) who, in different ways, make partial provision for similar dynamics, Fortes never explains why rivalries and latent hostilities are intrinsically built into relationships of close kinship. Fortes provides some hints, though, in his comments that "the rule posits ... that `kinsfolk' have irresistible claims on one another's support and consideration in contradistinction to `non-kinsmen,' simply by reason of the fact that they are kin. Kinsfolk must, ideally, share ... and they must, ideally, do so without putting a price on what they give" (1969, 238). In any event, there is a bottom line ("fiduciary element") in all this: "We do not have to love our kinsfolk, but we expect to be able to trust them in ways that are not automatically possible with nonkinsfolk" (249).

Fortes's views concerning the sources of ambivalence - and no less significant, his sense of the universal validity of his observations-can also be seen in his commentary on the following passage from Michael Young and Peter Willmott's classic study of family and kinship in East London:

> Parents do not choose their children, nor children their parents; the relationship exists whether or not either has the qualities which might arouse affection. Both are usually accepted despite their faults ... and what applies to parents and children applies in some measure to other relatives as well.... Affection ... becomes as reciprocal as duty. Affection, for its part, helps to make duty not so much the nicely balanced correlative of rights as a more or less unlimited liability beyond the bounds of self interest and rational calculation. ([1957] 1962, 194; cited in Fortes 1969, 242)

Fortes remarks that he has "recorded sentiments that are exactly the same among the Tallensi and the Ashanti, and their parallels can be found in any of the classical monographs on kinship in tribal society" (242).

I will return to some of the latter themes in due course. In the meantime, it bears noting that Fortes qualifies his position on the scope and force of prescriptive amity by acknowledging that "no society ... expects the general and diffuse moral prescriptions to be invariably adhered to" (238). To illustrate his point, he invokes Tallensi references to "criminal characters ... sinners ... selfish, foolish, dishonest, hypocritical people, and others of weak character" (238-39) who, as the Tallensi emphasize, do not adhere to the moral prescriptions at issue. What is interesting about this reference is the way its deployment bifurcates and purifies the social universe, thus more or less ruling out the existence of mixed - specifically, negative - emotions among the morally upright (those who are not criminals, sinners, fools, and so on), and simultaneously denying the existence of positive emotions among those who are not virtuous. This bifurcating and purifying move occurs even though Fortes has just made clear his view that rivalries and latent hostilities are intrinsically built into relationships of close kin. This move is even more curious in light of the fact that Fortes goes on to speak of jealousy and competitiveness in such relations (241) and presents observations such as: the recovery of money is said to be "doubtful" if lent to someone of one's own lineage; salaried employees among Ashanti in the 1940S "constantly complained of the demands made upon them by kinsfolk"; and "teachers and clerks preferred to be posted far from their natal communities to escape these irresistible demands" (246).

Questions thus arise as to whether the bifurcation and purification under consideration occurs because the Tallensi prefer not to elaborate on the negative sentiments and dynamics, and the divergent interests, at issue, or because Fortes does not want to sully his account or model, either of Tallensi kinship or of Kinship -with a capital Kin general. Whatever the answer, similar types of bifurcating moves amounting to what Marilyn Strathern (1988,1992a, 1992b) refers to as "domaining" occur in the ways Fortes sharply distinguishes kin and affines, kinship and locality (or polity), and of course kinship ("private") and political ("public") domains. Analogous domaining is evident in Fortes's tendency to treat data on witchcraft, sorcery, and the like as largely irrelevant to kinship and the social order.

Fortes's views as to the sources of ambivalence in kinship are clear enough: irresistible moral claims on one's autonomy and resources that are lodged in the name of kinship; the lack of choice available to those on whom such claims are lodged; and the fact that affection must be harnessed to duty and does indeed become duty, which is but one way of talking about the prescribed performance of emotion. But many questions are still left unanswered. Of broader concern is that in the case of Radcliffe-Brown, Evans-Pritchard, Fortes, and a good many other British social anthropologists (for instance, Firth [1951] 1963; Leach 1954, 1961a, 1961b), ethnographic evidence of mixed emotions exists alongside a marked reluctance or inability to incorporate such data into the larger analytic framework. This is partly because the authors' overdetermined Durkheimian concerns with structure and function, coupled with their particular (structural-functional) perspectives on structure, order, solidarity, coherence, and homeostasis (or equilibrium) within the politicojural domain, tended to preclude detailed analyses of sociality, as well as intentionality and agency (gendered or otherwise), power, and social transformation, all of which inevitably raise issues having to do with mixed emotions 4 Also relevant to the failure to incorporate evidence of ambivalence into models is that by the mid-twentieth century, anthropology's links with psychology, which had flourished earlier in the century, had been pared down; especially in British social anthropology, psychology was to a significant degree purged after W. H. R. Rivers and Bronislaw Malinowski.

A different and more recent version of this attention to, yet theoretical neglect of the pervasiveness of ambivalence can be seen in Carol Stack's pioneering treatise (1974) on African American kinship networks in an area around Chicago referred to as "The Flats." Stack's marxist-feminist orientation anticipates various aspects of the new kinship studies inasmuch as she situates her analysis of local kinship within a framework of gender and political economy, paying particular attention to the effects of joblessness, poverty, racism, and state welfare policies on gender relations, patterns of residence, informal adoption, and the durability and stability of conjugal bonds 5 Kinship, for Stack, becomes a strategic site of social action and resistance to the disenfranchisements of a racist society. But like Evans-Pritchard and Fortes, Stack's descriptions and interpretations play up the safety net as well as other utilitarian and Rousseauean features of local kinship, and are, in these and other ways, both idealized and romanticized.

Stack makes no analytic provision either for the potentially exploitative dimensions of local kinship or the profoundly mixed emotions expressed in some of the vignettes and other data she presents, such as those pertaining to Ethel, who helped raise a young woman, Georgia, and her children, considers Georgia's children as her own grandchildren, and "feel[s] intense love, obligation, and bitterness" toward them (1974, 75). This despite Stack's recognition that "close kin who have relied upon one another over the years often complain about the sacrifices they have made and the deprivation they have endured for one another" (36). As another woman remarked to Stack of the imperatives underlying her relationship with her mother: "I'm all worn out from running from my house to her house like a pinball machine.... I'm doing it 'cause she's my mother and 'cause I don't want to hurt her. Yet, she's killing me" (36).

Some of Stack's data are strikingly reminiscent of passages of the sort cited above from the works of Evans-Pritchard and Fortes. Others speak to the frustrated longing and disillusionment associated with Rayna Rapp's (1982) observation that while many women in the United States marry for love, they often find themselves quickly overwhelmed with babies and bills. Most germane for present purposes is that Stack makes no comment on the fact that if the residents of The Flats are financially able to do so, they commonly endeavor to move far away and completely sever ties with kin who have remained behind. Thus, one woman (Ruby) quipped of the possibility of marriage, which could potentially provide the financial security to safely withdraw from local kin networks: "If I ever get married, I'm leaving town!" (Stack 1974,115). Stack goes on to note, without comment: "While this study was in progress, Ruby did get married, and she left the state with her husband and her youngest child that very evening" (115).

Limitations of space preclude further discussion of the analytic marginalization of ambivalence in Stack's scholarship and in other classics typifying the theoretical approaches that dominated the study of kinship from the 1940s through the 1970s, such as those of Claude Levi-Strauss (1949, 1963), P. E. de Josselin de Jong (1951), Rodney Needham (1958a, 1958b), George Murdock (1949), Ward Goodenough (1951), Harold Schefer and Floyd Louns- bury (1971), David Schneider (1968), and Hildred Geertz and Clifford Geertz (1975). The foregoing will hopefully suffice to illustrate the fact that significant data bearing on ambivalence are certainly included in some of the classic studies representing the hegemonic paradigms in the field, but tend not to be theorized or otherwise worked into the analytic models of those who helped develop or refine the paradigms in question.

These generalizations do, of course, allow for certain (arguably partial) exceptions, such as the work of Victor Turner (1957), Melford Spiro (1977), and James Boon (1977). Each of the latter scholars was in important (albeit different) ways writing against the prevailing culture(s) of kinship studies, the more general contention being that hegemonies are never total or absolute, or as we shall see in the next section, eternal 6 Turner, for instance, took as his point of departure Max Gluckman's view of "social system[s] as ... field[s] of tension, full of ambivalence, of co-operation and contrasting struggle" (Turner 1957, xxii). It is noteworthy that Turner's ideas on social dramas and rituals as mechanisms of redress that resolve or ameliorate ambivalence and discharge tensions in fields of social relations were initially worked out in the context of a volume on kinship, Schism and Continuity in an African Society (1957). Equally worth mentioning is that while Turner (along with Clifford Geertz) was a key figure in the formulation of interpretive anthropology and also anticipated the subsequent emergence of practice theory and many other domains of contemporary inquiry, his initial interest in rituals of kinship led him, ultimately, to develop an anthropology of ritual -and to lay crucial groundwork for an anthropology of emotion and experience-rather than of kinship per se (see Turner 1967,1969; Turner and Bruner 1986). Had Turner set his analytic sights in the years after 1957 on kinship as such, we would no doubt be in a stronger position at present with respect to the theorization of ambivalence in kinship and of kinship generally.

Most relevant here, however, is that scholars such as Turner constitute the exceptions that prove the rule: In the approaches dominating the study of kinship from the 194os through the 1970s, data bearing on ambivalence tend to be dealt with as one or another caveat tempering a general model, or as little more than an afterthought -as in the justly famous final paragraphs of Levi-Strauss's 497-page The Elementary Structures of Kinship. It is precisely on grounds such as these that I maintain that from the 1940s through the 1970s, the topic of ambivalence was relegated to the analytic periphery of kinship studies.

AMBIVALENCE IN KINSHIP IN THE 19805 AND 19905

This section combines a review of changes in kinship studies with several summaries of recent approaches and issues that arise in them, with the aim of highlighting the relevance of these theoretical and empirical shifts for an understanding of ambivalence in kinship and social relations.' Ambivalence has come to assume greater analytic centrality in kinship studies as ethnographers have begun to take more seriously the need to better account for and contextualize the heterogeneous data bearing on mixed emotions encountered in the field. Ambivalence is still somewhat undertheorized, although as a consequence of the trends noted here, we are now in a better position to develop a richer and more nuanced sense of how kinship and social relations of other varieties are practiced, experienced, understood, and represented in specific societies and the myriad contexts that comprise them.

Significant changes in the study of kinship since the 1970s have included the rethinking of basic assumptions informing earlier work in the field (concerning the basic "building blocks" of kinship, for example), the waning of structural-functionalism as a guiding paradigm, and the fact that traditionally defined studies of kinship (like studies of other domains conceptualized in functionally defined institutional terms) experienced a precipitous decline in status within the discipline of anthropology as a whole. The nature of these transformations and the reasons for them have been discussed elsewhere (see Schneider 1984; Collier and Yanagisako 1987; Peletz 1995), and so need not detain us. Of more immediate concern here is that since the 198os, the field of kinship studies has been reconfigured and revived due in large part to the increased centrality within anthropology and other human sciences of marxist perspectives-including practice theory as developed by Pierre Bourdieu (1977), Marshall Sahlins (1981,1985), and Sherry Ortner (1984,1989,1996)- as well as numerous variants of feminism, poststructuralism, and postmodernism (for example, Ortner and Whitehead 1981; Rapp 1982, 1990; Goody 1983, 1990; Gailey 1987; Collier and Yanagisako 1987; Collier 1988; Strathern 1988,1992b; Bloch 1989; Trawick 1990; Weiner 1992; Kelly 1985,1993).

One of the more fruitful features of the reconstituted field of kinship studies is the scholarly energy devoted to understanding concrete social actors along with the specific contexts in which they organize themselves and their resources as well as create meaning and order in their lives. Inspired by the interpretive anthropology developed by Victor Turner and Clifford Geertz, and by the writings of Antonio Gramsci, Pierre Bourdieu, and Michel Foucault, much recent research has focused on the quotidian rounds and practices of variably situated, embodied social actors and the emotional tenor (feelingtones) of their daily experiences of intimacy and subordination (see, for example, di Leonardo 1984; Yanagisako 1985; Weston 1991). A good deal of this research has dealt with the politics of reproduction (for example, Ginsburg 1989; Ginsburg and Rapp 1995), and, not surprisingly, has frequently grappled with themes of ambivalence. Ann Anagnost's work on post-Mao China, for instance, reveals deeply mixed emotions concerning the state's birth control policies-"the center of party activism ... in the 198os and early 199os" (1995, 32). Given the prevalence in China of public discourses relating, according to Anagnost, "bodily quality to national strength," and the "sense of being caught between fears of social disorder and cultural stasis" (28), Chinese express "tremendous ambivalence" about those aspects of national policies aimed at "downsizing the population to allow for the disciplined ordering of bodies subject to a central educating authority" (28, 31). The case of Romania under the Nicolae Ceausescu regime reveals other types of ambivalences as rigid pronatalist policies aimed at building the labor force and, by extension, a triumphant socialism entailed the banning of birth control, compulsory pregnancy tests for women, and the keying of promotion and wage increases to fertility (see Kligman 1995). The resulting horrors of such policies included massive numbers of children abandoned by their mothers and warehoused in understaffed institutions where they often died of illness or neglect, or were exported via international adoption.

Related themes addressed by proponents of the new kinship studies include incest and domestic violence (see McKinnon 1995; Delaney, this volume) as well as abduction and rape in warfare as instruments of military strategy. Some of the most chilling narratives in this literature are from women taken as hostages following the partitioning of India and Pakistan. Hindu and Sikh women abducted by Muslim men, along with Muslim women abducted by Hindu or Sikh men, were in many cases forced into sexual relations and marriage by their captors. Testifying to a common scenario, one woman, when "rescued" and offered her "freedom," responded: "You have come to save us ... [and] take us back to our relatives. You tell us that our relatives are eagerly waiting to receive us. You do not know our society. It is hell. They will kill us" (Das 1995, 224). Many of these women chose violent death for themselves rather than return to live among kin whose codes of honor and purity would have rendered their lives extremely difficult at best.

Different kinds of violence, and different kinds of "exclusions, denials, and betrayals" (Delaney, this volume), are taken up by scholars who have documented the "coming out" narratives linking lesbians and gays involved in the creation of "chosen families" with their "straight" kin (Weston 1991). These narratives stress the performative dimensions of kinship both within chosen families

("love makes a family, nothing more, nothing less") and the straight families forced to confront their lesbian and gay kin. Many of these encounters result in painful censure and a renunciation of theoretically binding kinship, further heightening their emotional intensity (see also Weston, this volume; Lewin 1993).

Textual emphases on narrative, voice, practice, personhood, sex, and violence have played a seminal role in the reconfiguration of kinship studies. So, too, has the repatriation of (sociocultural) anthropology. In the case of kinship studies, this repatriation has involved a focus on the dynamics and reproduction of families and households among diverse groups of Europeans and Americans. Particular analytic attention has been devoted not only to lesbian and gay kinship but also to new reproductive technologies as well as the variegated ways in which symbols, idioms, and practices of kinship are implicated in identity politics and different types of racial, class, nationalist, and transnationalist discourses (see, for example, Rapp 1982, 1991; Yanagisako 1985; Yanagisako and Delaney 1995; Martin 1987; Strathern 1992a, 1992b; Borneman 1992; Bouquet 1993; Ragone 1994; Franklin 1997).

Two sets of issues addressed by ethnographers involved in the repatriation of kinship studies merit special note. The first concerns the exclusions, denials, betrayals, and disappointments associated with discontinuities and crises in filiation. As discussed by Charis Thompson (this volume), some of these discontinuities and crises are engendered by the disruptions in experiences, understandings, and representations of relatedness that occur in infertility clinics. These are exacerbated by the profound emotional labor that is necessary both to keep biological and social accounts of relatedness aligned in culturally meaningful ways, and to manage the anxiety associated with the failures of masculinity and femininity that are often experienced by the infertile. Other crises in filiation documented in recent years are linked to the intergenerational tensions, uncertainties, and discontinuities arising from widespread cohabitation and divorce, the ambivalence attendant on becoming a grandparent, and the fact that grandparents can both provide identity and deny it. Denials of the latter sort aggravate the crises in filiation besetting France (see Segalen, this volume) and perhaps all other societies where kinship remains central to "the formation of intimate relationships ... [though not necessarily to] institutional or social forms of groupings or units as such" (Strathern 1997; cited in Segalen, this volume).

A second (and related) set of topics addressed by those involved in the repatriation of kinship studies has to do with transnational and domestic transracial adoption. This literature is redolent with data bearing on ambivalence, partly because the types of adoption at issue are often seen, like adoption generally, as an "inferior" way of forming or adding to a family (see Gailey 1998). Other factors that figure into the frequently wrought emotional terrain include adoptive parents' deep apprehensions that birth parents may change their minds about relinquishing their child(ren), and anxious concerns about birth parents' class, ethnic, racial, and national backgrounds. These issues are all the more fraught in the case of "extra-tribal" adoptions of Native American children, which have been key components of coercive assimilationist policies that have resulted in holding Native American children captive to families and an entire society that seeks to transform them into their kin (see Strong, this volume).

In general, the repatriation of kinship studies has also involved greater interdisciplinarity as anthropologists working in Western milieus have realized the value of engaging sociology, social history, feminism, and sexuality studies in order to make sense of their data. The increasingly fruitful dialogue and blurring of boundaries between anthropology and sociology is particularly significant in light of the ethnographic turn taken by certain sociologists (discussed below), coupled with the long-standing centrality of conflict theory in the sociological tool kit, which is partly responsible for sociologists' acute analytic sensitivity to European and especially American families and households as contested sites of highly politicized debate and experience. Recent work on the sociology of the family, in other words, has focused squarely on themes that entail consideration of or invoke ambivalence (as well as alienation and tragedy) and has helped situate such topics at the heart of anthropological studies of kinship in Western settings and beyond.

Consider, for one, Nazli Kibria's (1993) ethnography of Vietnamese American families in Philadelphia, which reveals the complex and often contradictory reworking of Vietnamese traditions bearing on kinship and gender in a late-twentieth-century diasporic context. Taking issue with accounts that depict Vietnamese in the United States as yet another example of an Asian immigrant "success story," Kibria shows how Vietnamese cope with life in the States and how "modernization" is a highly uneven, ambivalence-laden process. Vietnamese American women experience what the author terms "triple oppression" and "multiple jeopardy" (19-20), but their households as well as kinship and gender roles are not simply arenas of subjugation. They are also sites of resistance and vehicles through which these women and their families struggle to survive. Equally important, while the ideology of family unity is frequently pressed into service to mask- thereby unwittingly symbolizingdiscordant interests, conflict, and resistance among household members, it is simultaneously a highly valorized component of the cultural identities of Vietnamese Americans, which like those of Cambodian Americans (SmithHefner 1999), Japanese Americans (Yanagisako 1985), Italian Americans (di Leonardo 1984), and many others, are hybrid, protean, and thoroughly suffused with ambivalence.

The prevalence of ambivalence and turbulence in gender-based struggles to control familial and other resources and institutions is powerfully foregrounded in Judith Stacey's (1991) ethnography of domestic upheaval among the "brave new families" of Silicon Valley. This study of families both literally and figuratively "on the faultline(s)" is one of many recent ethnographies documenting domestic comforts, crises, and contradictions in California, which according to Stacey, is "in the vanguard of post-industrial social transformations" (20), much as Karl Marx predicted in 188o when he remarked of the Golden State that "nowhere else has the upheaval most shamelessly caused by capitalist centralization taken place with such speed" (cited in Soja 1989,190). Stacey investigates the frontiers of contemporary morality through a focus on "divorce-extended" and other "recombinant" families among working-class whites buffeted about by cycles of economic expansion and "downsizing" along with other aspects of contemporary global capitalism. Underscoring that "traditions" are not given or fixed but continuously reworked in ironic and unintended ways, Stacey emphasizes themes of contradiction, paradox, and mixed emotion in the lives of the women she studied, much as Carol Stack had done for a previous era. Some of these women are heavily involved in local variants of patriarchal (yet also feminist-inspired) evangelical Christianity as a strategy to achieve emotionally sustaining and empowering intimacy in their marriages. Religiously sanctioned domestic submission thus emerges as one of the prices these women pay for new ways of belonging to variously imagined and frequently crosscutting class, ethnic, and moral communities. Not surprisingly, their domestic lives are heavily freighted with ambivalence (compare Ong 1995).

Other recent sociological research has more deeply probed some of the underlying causes of ambivalence in kinship, and has

also dealt more analytically with the political and economic contexts that both frame and engender the ambivalences at issue. Arlie Hochschild (1983,1990,1997), for example, has elucidated the underside of certain classic themes (such as "the axiom of amity") highlighted by Fortes and noted to a lesser extent by Evans-Pritchard. In her early scholarship on the commercialization of human feeling in the workplace, Hochschild developed the concepts of "emotion work" and "feeling rules." To paraphrase, emotion work refers to the typically timeconsuming and arduous emotional labor involved in forging, deepening, and repairing relationships, presupposing the (also) typically time-consuming and arduous tasks of noticing, acknowledging, and empathizing with the feelings of others, resolving quarrels, and soothing hurt feelings associated with the experience of real or imagined indignities (1997, 210). Feeling rules, for their part, pertain to the cultural guidelines specifying the mixes of feeling that are acceptable in particular contexts. Utilizing these concepts, Hochschild makes a number of critical points relevant to the mythology of the family as a "haven in a heartless world": "The family is often considered a `relief zone' away from the pressures of work, a place where one is free to be oneself. It may indeed be a refuge from the emotion work required on the job, but it quietly imposes emotional obligations of its own" (1983, 69). Hochschild elaborates by emphasizing that "in reality, ... the subterranean work of placing an acceptable inner face on ambivalence is actually all the more crucial [in the family]" (68), where for instance, "parental love ... is so important to security and sometimes so difficult to sustain" (69). "In fact, the deeper the bond, the more emotion work and the more unconscious we are of it. In the most personal bonds, then, emotion work is likely to be the strongest" (68).

Hochschild's more recent scholarship (1997) develops some of these themes in the course of documenting the unchecked expansion and speed-up of "work culture" at the expense of "family culture," and illustrating how the resultant Taylorization and temporal constriction of home life wreaks havoc on the increasingly devalued and neglected emotional lives of family members. The problem is not simply that the "emotional magnets beneath home and workplace are in the process of being reversed" as "tired parents flee a world of unresolved quarrels and unwashed laundry for the reliable orderliness, harmony, and managed cheer of work" (Hochschild 1997, 44). There is also "a new emotional economy at home," characterized in part by a climate of "emotional deregulation" in which "caring now seems to move around like financial capital to new investment opportunities whenever they appear" (162). The emotional liquidity at issue can make life frightening and traumatic for those on the receiving end of "emotional downsizing" or flight (162), though in such a climate everyone pays a psychic price, realized in part in (further) alienation and disinclination to trust.

What is not clear in the larger scheme of things, however, is Hochschild's view as to where all this ambivalence is coming from. It is implicit in her work that capitalism inflames or drives a wedge in most if not all types of kinship ties. But it is not at all obvious whether the main locus of ambivalence in the terrain of kinship that Hochschild surveys is the potentially arduous and unrequited emotion work involved in intimate kinship, the potentially jarring and traumatic disjunction between heavily idealized expectation and oftentimes painful experience, or some combination of these or related factors.

Despite these lacunae, Hochschild's influential sociology has productively informed the reconfiguration of kinship studies in anthropology. Her early writing (1983) provides theoretical inspiration for Unni Wikan's (1990) work on the management of "turbulent hearts" in Bali that stands as an exemplar of a certain type of practice theory, sometimes called the "anthropology of experience." Wikan's main objective is to "de-exoticize" and "de-essentialize" Bali by fleshing out the contours of Balinese interpersonal relations and social experience that have been given short shrift by Western observers captivated by cockfights, temple festivals, and irrigation societies. Wikan situates the long neglected topic of friendship squarely within the anthropological gaze, avoids the artificial separation of kinship from friendship and other social ties, and offers a most nuanced and sophisticated treatment of ambivalence and alienation, though strictly speaking, neither ambivalence nor alienation are among her primary concerns.

Wikan concentrates on the commonplace, the "concepts with which ... [Balinese] feel and think about, and handle, the tasks and tribulations of their individual existences" (1990, xvi), including their "feeling-thoughts" about the seamier side(s) of human nature and social relations. This emphasis stems from her conviction that the more encompassing institutions and structures of Balinese society have already been well described, and that while the famed commitments of Balinese to graceful performances are partly about "beauty for beauty's sake," they are also motivated by anxious concerns to avoid offending and provoking the ire of intimate others. This is, after all, a society where roughly half of all deaths are attributed to black magic or poisoning (43) -the significance of which, one might add, was largely lost on earlier investigators (for example, Geertz and Geertz 1975) due to analytic domaining that led them to exclude black magic and poisoning from their considerations of kinship.

Somewhat similar terrain is covered by Margaret Trawick's treatise on love in Tamil families, which underscores that "'meaning' cannot be pinned down, is always sought but never apprehended.... [and] is always inherently elusive and always inherently ambiguous" (1990, xix). Like Wikan's work on Bali, this study deals in a rather unsatisfactory manner with the actual structure and operation of the economy, caste, gender relations, and kinship as a system of signs that organizes "production and reproduction ... [as well as] the transfer of surplus from one category of person to another" (Bloch 1989,137). It does, moreover, elide the distinction between ambiguity and ambivalence - an analytic oversight that also detracts from the otherwise sophisticated and incisive work of Maurice Bloch (1989) and Zygmunt Bauman (1991). It nonetheless reveals in deeply interesting ways that ambiguity permeates "Hindu concepts of the sacred ... and pervades [everything] ... from speech to sexuality, from dreaming to blood" (Trawick 1990, 41); that "love" (anpu) is, without question, the most ambiguous - and ambivalent - of all; and that Tamil kinship "creates longings that can never be fulfilled" and is most appropriately understood "as a web maintained by unrelieved tensions, an architecture of conflicting desires" (152; compare Boon 1977).

Much more could be said about the theoretical treatment of ambivalence in Trawick's work as well as in that of Wikan and others discussed earlier in this section so as to further underscore the analytic centrality of ambivalence in the new kinship studies as compared with its relative marginalization in the approaches dominating the study of kinship from the 1940s through the 1970s. The foregoing should suffice, however, to provide an indicative sense of the increased salience of ambivalence in the study of kinship in the 198os and 199os. It should also help in identifying some of the variables that have brought about this change: the wane of long dominant (especially structuralfunctional) paradigms; the emergence of new approaches involving the blurring of disciplinary lines; the repatriation of kinship studies; the gendering of the field; the heightened attention devoted to issues of personhood, agency, voice, power, reproduction, denials, and exclusions; and last but not least, the absolute increase in the sum total of uncertainty, alienation, and ambivalence that exists in the worlds It remains to offer some exploratory comments concerning what general insights and lessons can be gleaned from this recent work, and where one might go from here.

Balinese, and perhaps Tamils, are forever anxious about "liv[ing] always exposed and vulnerable" (Wikan 1990, 81) to the threats of others, and in this respect have much in common with Malays (see Peletz 1996; Stivens 1996; Carsten 1997). Particularly relevant here are Balinese and Malay perceptions that they live in panopticons in which all kinship and social relations are ultimately power laden and hierarchical, and all social activities are scrutinized and evaluated by intimate and not-so-intimate others. This is not the panopticon of Foucault (1977), where Big Brother or his agents, with their unrelenting gazes and disciplinary mechanisms, penetrate the most intimate recesses of personal space and consciousness. Indeed, the feelings of vulnerability experienced by Balinese and Malays differ markedly from those experienced by the inhabitants of Foucault's panopticons inasmuch as they are only minimally related to their positions in class or other relatively fixed status hierarchies, and are only minimally keyed to the presence of Big Brother or his agents. These feelings stem instead from the hundreds if not thousands of big and little brothers and sisters peopling their kinship and social universe(s) - good numbers of whom are assumed to be deploying the social and cultural resources at their disposal in order to enhance (or at least maintain) their own status and prestige while simultaneously undercutting the status and prestige claims of others.

Balinese and Malay feelings of vulnerability serve as powerful moral constraints and thus need to be given their full analytic due. This is especially so when exploring themes of central import in contemporary social theory, such as structure and agency, domination and resistance. I make the point partly because moral variables tend to be given insufficient attention in studies of domination and resistance that speak to issues of structure and agency unless they "muddy the `class waters'" or otherwise impinge on relations of power and domination between major status groups (landlords and tenants, "rich" and "poor," and so on).

The underlying issue is that while many scholars of resistance (for instance, Taussig 1980; Scott 1985) frequently distance themselves from marxist theories of exploitation and class, they often preserve one of marxism's hidden premises: the tendency to regard class as somehow the most "essential," natural, or unfetishized of all social groupings, and therefore to see class interests as the most important or rational of all social interests. Data from Bali, Malaysia, and elsewhere indicate that if one is to understand kinship or social relations of any variety, one needs to take more seriously culturally specific (as well as generalized) forms of personal submission, humiliation, degradation, and "coercive incorporation" (Carsten 1997) that are not tied to class-based (or feudal) hierarchies, or to systems of caste, apartheid, slavery, and the like (see Peletz 1997; Ortner 1995). Put differently, just as kinship is as much about institutionalized power relations as class, the focus on class has obscured many power-laden and other significant dimensions of kinship and social relations of other varieties.

As anthropologists, we need to deploy a more critical gaze in order to understand the symbols, meanings, emotional economies, and social actions implicated in prescriptive amity, "diffuse, enduring solidarity," and attendant imperatives embedded in normative cultural statements such as "Home is the place they have to let you in." At the least, we need to ponder more deeply the analytic implications of three (related) sets of issues bearing on the key point that people everywhere internalize - and operate in the world in accor dance with -multiple evaluative frameworks and structures of feeling. First, the sentiments and moral obligations encoded in normative statements of the sort cited above may well be reassuring to those knocking on the door of a close or long-lost relative, but may also entail a profound degree of anxiety concerning the authenticity of prescribed emotion. Furthermore, for reasons that were noted long ago by Evans-Pritchard and have since been explored more thoroughly by others, the sentiments and moral obligations at issue are not necessarily all that comforting, and may indeed be rather disconcerting, to those who feel that they must (or should) answer the door. The last set of issues concerns certain insights developed in different ways by Sigmund Freud, Georg Simmel, Erving Goffman, and others: all emotional attachments are conducive to the realization of ambivalence; intense attachments are thoroughly suffused with mixed emotions; and as Turner remarked some time ago of the Ndembu and would most likely generalize far beyond, "the closer the tie, the greater the ambivalence of feeling" (1957, 249; compare Weiner 1992; Beidelman 1993).

These insights lead me to suggest that (among other things) more consideration be devoted to certain psychological perspectives that have the potential to shed additional light on the mechanisms and loci implicated in the production of various types of mixed emotions. Highly germane are views bearing on some of the psychological dynamics entailed in the construction of difference, the pervasive tendency to convert difference into hierarchy, and the ways identity is produced through negation. As Peter Stallybrass and Allen White observe, in all systems of hierarchy the dependence of the "top" on the "bottom," the "high" on the "low," produces a "mobile, conflictual fusion of power, fear, and desire in the construction of subjectivity" (1986, 5), and thus necessarily involves profound ambivalence. This is especially relevant to the themes of this essay in that symbols and idioms of kinship and gender are invariably "about" differentiation and exclusion, as well as commonality and inclusion, and are, more broadly, key components of systems of morality and virtue that encode hierarchically phrased and heavily value-laden difference. Among Malays and other Muslims such as Acehnese, Minangkabau, Javanese, and Bedouin who I compare to Malays elsewhere (see Peletz 1996), part of the dynamic at issue has to do with the fact that masculinity is cast in strongly relational terms (colored, at least in the instance of Malays from Negeri Sem- bilan, by the disjunction between the idealized role of the older brother that informs the husband/father role, on the one hand, and the actual, economis- tically defined performance of the husband/father role, on the other). Men are troubled by the fact that on some levels, they define themselves in complementary opposition to females (also cast in heavily relational terms), yet simultaneously see and fear in themselves the constellations of features that index femininity as well as the inferior moral status of children and ethnic others. For their part, women are often stigmatized and sometimes deeply troubled by the same ideological framework that they commonly turn on men to assert their own moral superiority. These patterns are inflected by class and have a decidedly Islamic hue, yet the underlying dynamics are broadly distributed cross-culturally (see Gregor 1985; Chodorow 1989).

> A recurrent pattern emerges: the "top" attempts to reject and eliminate the bottom for reasons of prestige and status, only to discover ... that it is in some ways frequently dependent upon that low-Other (in the classic way that Hegel describes in the master-slave section of the Phenomenology).... and that the top includes that low symbolically, as a primary eroticized constituent of its own fantasy life. The result is a mobile, conflictual fusion of power, fear, and desire in the construction of subjectivity: a psychological dependence upon precisely those Others which are ... opposed ... at the social level. (Stallybrass and White 1986, 5-6)

Many other sites in the production of ambivalence merit serious analytic consideration in the context of the themes discussed in this essay, but unfortunately cannot be explored at length here. Some of these sites, I should note, are not universally deeply

intertwined with, or in the very nature of, kinship, while others are. These (at times overlapping) sites include: the tragedies of humankind's self-consciousness, elements of which sometimes take the form of nagging and potentially debilitating awareness of existential "absurdities" (of the sort variously celebrated by Albert Camus, Jean-Paul Sartre, Vladimir Nabakov, and Woody Allen- to mention only a few not so strange bedfellows); the antinomies of religious experience; the interrelationship and emotional power of sex, birth, death, and aging; the sundered selves and countless double binds and paradoxes of modernity; and the role of kinship in providing conceptual linkages between -indeed, key features of the very definitions of- human society and culture, on the one hand, and the domain of "nature," on the other, especially in contexts where nature is increasingly seen as full of "contradictions, tensions, and ambiguities" that necessarily suffuse and "infect" kinship (Jordanova 1986, 39 [cited in Strathern 1992a, 209 n. 231; see also Bauman 1991; Weigert 1991; Appadurai 1996).

In most societies, moreover, regardless of whether people are heavily ex ploited subjects without codified rights or modern, rights-bearing citizens, the forces of market and state constrict and devalue private lives. This is all the more true when elites and others pursue projects of ethnic cleansing, racial purification, modernity, or civil society. The intentional and unrelenting destruction of households, families, and virtually all private domains and personal spaces in Cambodia under the Pol Pot regime (1975-1979), which "probably exerted more power over its citizens than any state in world history" (Kiernan 1996, 464), is but one extreme case of what is surely a universal phenomenon: a polity (in this instance a modern state) posited on compliance that transcends feeling. Even when projects of modernity and/or civil society do not involve ethnic cleansing or racial purification, their achievement usually engenders profound ambivalence since they typically presuppose foregrounding or appropriating certain sentiments and discourses of kinship while simultaneously delegitimizing or deforming other modalities of relatedness (for example, "extended kinship") in which people still feel morally or materially invested.

FINAL THOUGHTS

In light of the myriad sites in the production of ambivalence that have been enumerated here, it seems reasonable to suggest that ambivalence is a feature of virtually all kinship systems, and that this is so not only because of the contradictory structural imperatives inherent in such systems (and all other institutions) but also because something like prescriptive amity or "diffuse, enduring solidarity" seems to be a feature of virtually all such systems. This necessarily involves a number of "things": webs of deep-seated longing; potentially time-consuming, arduous, and/or alienating (if only because frustrating and/or unrequited) emotional labor associated with the invariably precarious transformation of duty into authentic emotional motivation; the possibility of profoundly disheartening disjunction between yearning or expectation, on the one hand, and actual experience, on the other; and of course, morally compelling demands to share, give up, or exchange, which frequently have very real material consequences with respect to the pursuit of individual and collective interests.

To advance this general argument about the ubiquity of mixed emotions - particularly after citing the psychoanalytic formulations of Stallybrass and White-is not to claim that ambivalence is equally (socially or culturally) elaborated in all systems, or that its elaboration is experienced or enacted to the same degree, or in similar ways or domains, in all systems. There is tremendous cross-cultural and historical variation in the social expression and cultural elaboration of ambivalence. And there are a plethora of gendered, racialized, and class-specific sites in the production of ambivalence in any given society at any particular moment in time, and for any individual over his or her life course - as well as multitudes of combinations of variably inflected mixed emotions, many of which may be keyed to different sets of interests and imbued with potentially disparate constellations of values, significance, and meaning. One formidable challenge facing ethnographers is thus to do a better job engaging, accounting for, historicizing, and otherwise contextualizing and distinguishing the heterogeneous data bearing on ambivalence encountered in the field and archives. This may well require developing a more sophisticated vocabulary and theoretical apparatus bearing on feeling-tone and experience (or becoming more familiar with the tool kits of disciplines that already have them). It will in any case necessitate keeping sight of the value of theorizing not only the phenomena about which one is generalizing but also the ways such phenomena are reproduced and transformed by the encompassing structures-of markets, states, and nationalist discourses, for example -that inform individual and collective interests, and otherwise impinge on the everyday practices, experiences, and meanings of people's lives.

The highly complex and heterogeneous nature of the feeling-tones at issue is one of the reasons why, despite important advances in recent years, ambivalence remains relatively undertheorized in the literature (but see Weigert 1991; Bauman 1991; Wolfe 1989), especially the ethnographic literature, although other variables figure in as well. The latter include various instances of domaining: for example, the tendency, which is pronounced in structuralfunctionalist texts and certain treatises of a more symbolic/ interpretive nature, to treat sorcery and witchcraft in discussions and analyses that are separate(d) from those bearing on kinship and the social order; and the contemporary proclivity, when focusing on private and intimate experience, to give relatively short shrift to large-scale structures and theory alike. Other variables include the long-standing disinclination of anthropologists to deal critically with the "negative" dimensions of the societies they study; this derives partly from the "myth of primitive harmony" (Edgerton 1992) underlying much of twentieth-century anthropologythe more encompassing dynamic being the romantic motives and sensibilities informing the anthropological enterprise since its inception. A somewhat related variable that has come into play in recent decades is the reluctance of many American femi nists and others to fully engage the psychoanalytic literature on dependency, anxiety, and identity.'

Regardless of what constraints have inhibited the theorization of ambivalence, it is clear that our analytic gaze needs to be focused not simply on official structures, ideologies, exegetic idioms, and public contexts but also on suppressed, submerged, and other alternative discourses that bear on the seamier side(s) of human nature and social relations, and that are in many cases articulated primarily in relatively private contexts or with reference to personal experience. Such a focus may yield data and perspectives whose airing strikes some observers as impolitic with respect to the sensitivities of those among whom they work. But it seems to me that a far greater disservice is done to them by producing heavily idealized and one-dimensional (ethnographically thin) accounts of their social worlds and their lived relations to them. To put this in more positive terms, I would argue that the most important contributions to the various communities with which anthropologists are involved are contextually sensitive and otherwise ethnographically thick descriptions and interpretations of the diverse structural arrangements, modalities, and representations of human sociality in all their fascinating richness and complexity, warts and all.

I believe that if such accounts are undertaken, anthropologists will be better positioned to develop a richer and more nuanced sense of how kinship and social relations of other varieties are ordered, practiced, experienced, understood, and represented in specific societies and the multiple contexts that comprise them. Such accounts will also facilitate a better understanding of phenomena that are central to a good deal of contemporary scholarship in the human sciences, including structure and agency, power and resistance (as mentioned earlier), as well as ideology. As regards ideology, four sets of issues merit brief remark. First, ideologies must be psychologically compelling if they are to be effective; as well, the psychologically compelling nature of ideologies has both cognitive and emotional dimensions (see Althusser 1969); and as such, both of these dimensions must be dealt with analytically. Second, subversive discourses are often fueled by the disjunctive relationship between hegemonic ideological formations, on the one hand, and sentiments and dispositions engendered in everyday, practical experiences or "lived relations to the world," on the other (see Bourdieu 1977, Abu-Lughod 1986). The third point, which follows from the others, is that failure to attend to such sentiments and dispositions -and more generally, to the "structures of feeling" (see Williams 1977) that may entail "the stirring of `emergent' forms of con sciousness" (Eagleton 1991, 49) -hinders our understanding of key sources of subversive discourses, and likewise leaves us with an overly "muscular" sense of culture's formative or constituting capacities. The fourth and most fundamental point in all of this is that by attending more carefully to the interplay of culture, political economy, and emotion, and to the politics of ambivalence in particular, we will be able to engage and account for more of our data, and will be able to produce descriptions and analyses that are more comprehensive and elegant as well as better theorized. We will, in short, be better able to appreciate the Janus-faced nature of the human condition.

I return, finally, to the OED, whose entries on ambivalence were cited at the outset of this essay. The OED's examples of usage of the term in the early twentieth century includes entries in psychiatry textbooks to the effect that ambivalence is a debilitating disease: "It is chiefly ambivalent complexes that influence pathology"; "ambivalence is ... one aspect of the not yet fully understood disorder of association which [is] ... suppose[d] to be the fundamental defect in schizophrenic thinking." In the present context, such views seem quite antiquated. We are, I think, on firmer ground if we conceptualize ambivalence as "an underappreciated but responsible moral stance, and one well suited for democratic citizenship" (Stacey 1991, 270-71). To put this in Alan Wolfe's terms: "Given the paradoxes of modernity, there is little wrong, and perhaps a great deal right, with being ambivalent -especially when there is so much to be ambivalent about" (1989, 211).

NOTES

i Both meanings are suggested by the term "Janus-faced." Janus, the Roman deity who served as the doorkeeper of heaven and the patron of beginnings and endings, is typically represented as having two faces, one in front and the other at the back of his head. The two faces lead some to think of the bivalent aspect(s) of ambivalence; but with two faces, Janus could see all around him, thus pointing to the multi- or polyvalent aspect(s) of ambivalence.

2 The decision to begin the discussion with works of the 1940s is based chiefly on limitations of space. I am not suggesting that kinship studies did not exist before 1940, or that contributions to the field published prior to 1940 were necessarily similar to those produced in the 1940s. That said, the relative analytic neglect of ambivalence is also characteristic of most kinship studies before 1940.

3 "The axiom of amity" resonates deeply with the notion of "diffuse, enduring solidarity" that David Schneider (1968) identified as a key symbol of American kinship (Schneider and Smith 1973, 14). Nevertheless, Schneider (1980, 120-21) has rejected the claims of Fortes and others that something like prescriptive amity or "diffuse, enduring solidarity" is a feature of all kinship systems.

4 Edmund Leach (1954) constitutes a partial exception to some of my generalizations concerning British social anthropologists; see also the brief discussion of Victor Turner (1957) below.

5 Stack's attention to political economy brings to mind major French figures in kinship studies who are excluded here for reasons of space -for example, Emmanuel Terray, Claude Meillassoux, and Maurice Godelier.

6 I should emphasize that since my universe in this section of the essay consists of anthropologists who helped define the field of kinship studies from the 1940S through the 1970s, the work of Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict, and Edward Sapir is only indirectly relevant, as is true for the later period of the contributions of Clifford Geertz, Michelle Rosaldo, and others who have dealt explicitly with experience and emotion -including ambivalence -but are not generally regarded as central to the field of kinship. A lengthier treatment of the themes addressed here would confirm my arguments, yet would also be more nuanced: for example, by discussing the period since the 1940S in terms of more subtle temporal distinctions; by elaborating on differences (and similarities) in dominant and alternative theoretical approaches; and by analyzing the works of Bronislaw Malinowski, Margaret Mead, Gregory Bateson, and others.

7 This section focuses on the 198os and 199os, but includes discussion of work in this volume (2001).

8 Concerning this increase, see Weigert 1991; Bauman 1991; Wolfe 1989.

9 For a discussion of this point, see Hollway and Featherstone 1997; exceptions to the generalization include Spiro 1977; Chodorow 1978, 1989; and Gregor 1985.

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